Flight Service Sigmet

There’s been more talk on Capital Hill about what’s happening with what used to be ‘Flight Service.’ Recent hearings at the House aviation subcommittee have resulted in the FAA being asked to submit a progress report “every 90 days to ensure that the FS21 [flight service twenty-first century] service provided by Lockheed Martin is equal to or better than the old FAA-operated system.”

In his letter to Secretary of Transportation Mary Peters, Costello said that the report should “include the steps that Lockheed Martin is taking to correct the prominent deficiencies, as a result of flight service station (FSS) consolidation, in providing adequate local knowledge for every pilot’s intended route of flight.”

We couldn’t help but laugh when we read that. OASIS was a Flight Service technology that controllers could actually use to great effect in serving pilots. It took years to get it to a reliable, usable version and was in about a dozen stations before the roll-out was halted. FS21 is a cobbled mish-mash, thrown together in an effort to meet an artificial deadline. To think that such an amalgam of dissimilar parts could be equal to or better than even the outdated, widely used (but time-tested) Model 1 is rather a joke.

While the attention on Capital Hill is welcome, we are inclined to think that Congress will be equally effective in its oversight role as FS21 is in its own sphere. We’ve heard through the grapevine that some in the LM executive ranks are “embarrassed” by the system they’ve foisted on controllers and the flying public. The FAA, on the other hand continues whistling past the graveyard, confident in the wreckage they continue to manage and spin. And Congress? They’ll be embarrassed to the extent that they ever really get a clue.

There’s something to look at in the annual speech by FAA Administrator. Two quotes just don’t seem to mesh very well. First, there’s the self pat on the back:

“If you want to be a first-rate organization, you’ve got to operate like one. From the creation of the ATO back in 2004 to the competitive outsourcing of automated flight service stations, we’ve shown that this organization is capable of handling change and big-ticket items. [emphasis added]”

It’s difficult to square this with an earlier statement in the same speech:

“With all of that said, the focus, and success, of the Flight Plan has been its link to the organizational success increase — the OSI. The big question, as always, are we going to make it? This year, going into the final weeks, I can’t predict whether or not we’ll hit 90 percent of our goals and receive the full payout. As of today, we know we have three red targets that will stay red for the remainder of the year. Those are the commercial fatal accident rate, the average daily airport capacity at the big seven metro airports, and our customer satisfaction rating. That last one, which comes from the 2007 commercial pilots survey, was an unexpected reversal. We're still analyzing the specific comments submitted by the pilots, but they seem to be concerned about three things: the response they’ve been getting from Flight Service Stations during the transition, the perennial issue of standardization among FSDOs, and the potential for user fees. [emphasis added]”

The OSI (organizational success increase) is an annual ‘bonus’ of increased base pay given to all FAA employees if the agency meets it’s preset goals for the fiscal year. Three items are in ‘red,’ one of which is customer satisfaction, brought about, in part, by the poor performance of the contracted flight service stations.

So, the FAA has shown that it is “first rate” by providing bad service via contracting. This could result in an interesting justice…FAA employees my not get their full pay increase because of how badly the contract was handled. For an organization trying to paint itself as ‘successful’ they obviously didn’t know how one of their key components functioned, thus couldn’t tell if they were letting a properly written contract. They weren’t, of course, and the result is pilot dissatisfaction that might finally hit FAA employees in the pocketbook.

Flight Service was always the FAA’s ‘front line’ air traffic function, the agency’s daily ambassadors to the users, if you will. Blakey may claim an “unexpected reversal” in pilot satisfactions, but the AFSS Controllers, who know pilots and their needs best, said from the get-go what would happen.

John Carr left the FAA after losing his bid to keeping his job as NATCA president. Taking his bat and ball and going home? Did he forget how to actually control traffic while acting as President and couldn’t face the scope again? Hard to say…

But his bluster continues on his blog and there seems to be no change to the self-serving, self-delusional reading of his tenure as NATCA president. In this post he attempts to remind people of “…the lengths to which NATCA went to try and get the Flight Service folks transferred into Centers, Towers and TRACONS.”

As Flight Service controllers who lived through the A-76 outsourcing to Lockheed Martin, this caused us to laugh out loud. John Carr and NATCA did nothing of substance to assist us in 2004-2005, or anytime since. Oh, there may have been some pretty statements and a few crocodile tears but there was never anything approaching “lengths” to come to the aid of his AFSS controlling brethren.

Really, though, NATCA has long looked at Flight Service in the same manner the FAA did…second class controllers (at best), red-headed step-child, etc. etc. It used to be common for FSS controllers to ‘cross options’ and move into a tower or even center. But NATCA pushed for a job bid form that punishes FSS controllers by deducting ‘bid points’ for each year they did not work in a tower or center. This effectively removed many previously eligible FSS controllers from consideration for tower and center positions.

Then there was the ‘seniority rule’ that NATCA adopted a few conventions ago. Seniority used to be based on ‘2152’ time, which included FSS controllers. But NATCA changed that, sending multi-decade controllers to the bottom of the seniority list at towers and centers.

The only “lengths” Mr. Carr goes to involves spin of the most extreme sort.

Imagine the following scenario…a railroad engineer accelerates a train to top speed toward a broken bridge. Once the train reaches top speed he leaves the engine cab. With the train unable to stop before reaching the bridge, a second engineer takes control and does not prevent the crash. In fact, the actions of the second engineer are debatable as to any positive effect in mitigating the situation, and may have made it worse.

Question: who is most responsible for the crash, the first engineer or the second?

To use the reasoning found in some Air Traffic Control (ATC) blogs, the answer is the second. Everything that is wrong with ATC can be laid at the doorstep of departing FAA administrator Marion Blakey, and all was hunky-dory prior to her arrival.

Let’s add a second facet to our initial scenario: the passengers on the train were cheering the first engineer as the train gathered speed, yelling “Faster! Faster!” while accusing the second of “malfeasance in office, perjury, theft, and treason.”

In FAA terms, the first engineer can be thought of as Ms. Blakey’s predecessor, Jane Garvey. During her term, controller compensation skyrocketed, operational discipline declined, infrastructure problems went unaddressed. Controllers grew to expect that they also controlled the FAA, in effect at times, displacing local management. No wonder they enjoyed her reign and despise Blakey’s, who saw the out-of-control work area, sky-high compensation structure, loose work rules, and tried to do something about them.

This is not to say that Blakey made the right choices; we disagree with some of them ourselves. But there’s no question that ATC operations were out of control and needed to be reigned in. The excesses of the previous administrator set the table for a financial train-wreck that led to the AFSS outsourcing. No matter what the “right” choices were that Blakey did or did not make, they would have raised the ire of her NATCA detractors.

Something we didn't realize is that comments to this blog have been placed on a 'hold' awaiting 'moderation.' We're not sure when that began, since we initially set this blog to publish all comments as they are made.

Today we published all that were awaiting disposition.

Our fault...and apologies.

One could say that the AOPA has changed its view of contracted Flight Service from ‘cheerleader’ to ‘buyer’s remorse.’ Let’s take a look at the chronology.

AOPA President Phil Boyer waxed enthusiastic about the contracting of Flight Services almost from the very start, based on a fear than any ‘unbid’ future government forms of the Service would involve user-fees. Once Lockheed Martin won the contract, Mr. Boyer could hardly contain his enthusiasm, declaring “all I can say is, ‘Wow!’” (3/05). Our opinion at the time seems to be rather prescient, if we do say so ourselves:

"Now we’re certain that LM showed Mr. Boyer some wonderful bells and whistles when they briefed him on the equipment they’ve created for FSS use, and there’s little doubt that what he saw is better than what most FSSs have now (aside from OASIS that is in a few stations). But this would be true of any of the five bidders. What we need to realize is that Mr. Boyer has no experience at all delivering air traffic services or using any such equipment to brief pilots. We should largely dismiss his “wow” comment as uninformed and inexpert.

Let us be clear; no Air Traffic Controller currently certified to provide flight services to pilots had input on the LM system or has seen it in action. In fact one could assert that Mr. Boyer saw little more than ‘vaporware’, an untested beta version of a system that has yet to be approved for use or even compatible with the current National Airspace System databases." (7/26/05)

Mr. Boyer’s stance never wavered, promising that “the consolidation of these facilities should not impact the level of service pilots receive” (9/29/05).

The first indication that things weren’t going quite as promised was AOPA’s admission that “Some members may not agree, but overall, Lockheed Martin has earned a B+ so far for its operation of the flight service station (FSS) system…” (8/23/06). Nevertheless, the best possible face was put in the “modernization” as facilities closed (2/26/07).

But as facilities closed and the predicted (at least by us) weaknesses began to surface, AOPA could no longer whitewash the facts from general aviation pilots. Admitting to ‘frustration,’ AOPA acknowledged that too many pilots were experiencing problems with the new system (4/25/07).

The ‘negative vibes’ began to mount and AOPA had to fully admit to “Long hold times. Disconnects. Lost flight plans” (5/4/07). Andy Cebula, AOPA executive vice president of government affairs said that “This is not the level of service pilots expect.” This is the same Andy Cebula that in July of 2005 stated that “Regardless of who provides the service, pilots need and deserve much better than what they're getting now.” We chided Mr. Cebula’s spin of the A-76 process (8/2/05) and he should be reminded of his misplaced optimism.

Inevitably, Mr. Boyer had to face reality:

“In short, the FS21 (twenty-first century) system is in crisis and failing pilots. Based on the hundreds of complaints that AOPA has received in the past month, it is clear that the technical and operational problems plaguing FS21 are now affecting safety.” (5/11/07)

It’s a reality that we predicted on 10/4/05:

“Our position remains unchanged…that pilot contacts are likely to be longer due to 'cover your rear' concerns, and with a slashed workforce of diluted expertise and promised metrics (not yet fully revealed), Mr. Boyer’s dream of cheap, fast, personal, local, expert service is not likely to be realized. One or more of those will have to give.”

And in his most recent missive, Mr. Boyer stated that “…while some teething pains could be expected during such a radical transformation of an antiquated system, the problems have deteriorated recently from inconvenient to dangerous.” To emphasize the point a graphic was added to the story, a frustrated pilot staring at a phone.

There’s even a blog to chronicle the day-to-day soap opera.

Sorry, but we just can’t resist the obvious…we told you so.

No, we haven't been active on this blog. There seemed little point in posting diatribes over minutia or 'inside baseball' events that only the controllers could identify with but might be invisible to the pilots. That has now changed. It's time to chronicle what everyone now realizes; the emperor has no clothes.

They never existed in the first place.

We're all aware of the FAA's move to allow older pilots in airline cockpits. Air Traffic Controllers are correct to ask why they shouldn't be included. The FAA response so far has been that while the FAA is allowed by statute to set the forced retirement age for pilots, changing controller age would take an act of Congress.

Perhaps adding fuel to the argument for a higher retirement age is this report showing that older pilots perform better due to their experience. Now we're well aware of the 'battling study' syndrome when it comes to deciding any given issue, but we haven't seen a recent equivalent study showing justification for forcing controller retirement at 55.

But it's our thought that the FAA wants to remove older, more 'expensive' controllers in favor of younger, cheaper ones. They're not about to push for a higher retirement age. We'll see what NATCA does with this issue, and how Congress responds.